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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdictional statement in Petitioner’s brief and Intervening-Petitioner’s
brief is incomplete and incorrect. Intervening-Respondents, Meki Bracken (“Meki”) and
Diana Lin (“Diana”), seek enforcement of the order by the Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) against Petitioner, Jennifer Ho (“Ho”)
and Intervening-Petitioner, Chak Man Fung (“Fung”). See 42 U.S.C. 3612(b)-(h). This
Court has jurisdiction over a Petition for Review of a decision of an administrative law
judge in a fair housing proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 3612(i). Meki and Diana were
subjected to Ho and Fung’s discriminatory housing practices in Chicago, Illinois which
falls under the jurisdiction of this Circuit. See §3612(i)(2) and 24 CFR §180.710(a). Any
party adversely affected by a final decision may file a petition in the appropriate Court
of Appeals for review of the decision under 42 U.S.C. 3612(i), 28 U.S.C. 2342(6), and 42
U.S.C. 3612(j)(1). A default order was entered against Ho and Fung on October 18, 2007,
pursuant to 24 C.F.R. 180.420(b).A damages hearing was held on November 15, 2007.
On January 31, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Constance T. O’Bryant (“ALJ”), in her
Initial Decision, found Ho and Fung liable for damages.
The Initial Decision, by operation of law, became HUD’s final Order on March 3,
2008 pursuant 42 U.S.C. 3612(h)(1). Ho timely filed her petition for review on March 31,
2008, with this court (No. 08-1763). This court dismissed Fung’s untimely petition for
review but gave him leave to intervene on May 2, 2008. On May 16, 2008, HUD filed a
cross-application for enforcement of the agency's order (No. 08-2159) and Intervening–
1




Respondents were given leave to intervene in both cases 08-1763 and 08-2159.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Response Brief:
1) Whether Ho’s due process rights were violated, even though she was properly
served with process, notice of proceedings and administrative orders.
2) Whether the ALJ’s denial for a continuance at the hearing violated Petitioner’s
due process.
3) Whether the ALJ had a duty to inform Petitioner that she had the right to have an
attorney present at the hearing.
4) Whether the ALJ had a duty to procure a translator for the hearing.
Intervening-Respondents/Cross-Petitioners Cross-Application Issues:
1. Whether the agency’s award and decision against Petitioners was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”.
2. Whether the damages presented by Intervening-Respondents were supported
by substantial evidence and whether this court should enforce the cross-application.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent HUD’s statement of the case.
See HUD Br. at 3. 1

 

The following citations are used throughout this brief: (1) “Fung Br.” refers to
Respondent Fung’s Brief filed on November 14, 2008; (2) “Pet. Ho Br.” refers to
Petitioner Ho’s Brief filed on November 14, 2008; (3) “Tr.” refers to the transcript from
the Damages Hearing on November 15, 2007; and (6) “Initial Decision” (“I.D.”) refers to
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Parties
a. Intervenor Meki Bracken
Meki comes from a diverse racial background, her father is African-American

and her mother is Samoan. (Tr. 169). As her father testified, the Bracken family has “just
about every race of people you can possibly have.”(Tr. 237). Meki grew up in Detroit,
Michigan, and attended private schools which were primarily White. (Tr. 168). She is a
world traveler and enjoys learning about diverse cultures. (Tr. 236). Throughout her
travels, Meki has visited New Zealand, Samal, Canada, Mexico, and Japan. (Tr. 236).
Before 2004, she never experienced discrimination because of her blended racial
background. (Tr. 170). In May 2004, Meki graduated from Oakwood College in
Huntsville, Alabama. (Tr. 170). Meki planned on living in Chicago after graduation and
working at the law firm Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., (“Sachnoff”) before entering law
school in the Fall. (Tr. 171).
b. Intervenor Diana Lin
Diana Lin is a female of Chinese Taiwanese descent. (Tr. 31). She was born in
Chicago and grew up in Palos Park and Palos Heights, Illinois. (Tr. 37). Diana lived in a
“99 percent White” neighborhood and experienced a multitude of “racial hostility”
while growing up. (Tr. 38). Neighborhood children told her, “go back to your own
country,” her garage door was routinely egged, and neighborhood children shot a BB
    

Judge O’Byrant’s Initial Decision entered on January 31, 2008, and “HUD Br.”, refers to
Respondent HUD’s brief. 
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gun at her father’s car as he drove through her neighborhood. (Tr. 38). Such racial
discrimination left Diana embarrassed to be Asian and caused her to want to “hide” her
heritage. (Tr.38).
Diana attended an exchange program at Swarthmore College, [in Swarthmore,
Pennsylvania], during her sophomore year. The campus spewed of racial tension as a
group of skinheads had attacked several African-American students and a stolen
portrait of Malcolm X which was subsequently returned with a noose drawn around
Malcolm X’s neck. (Tr. 39–40). The events at Swarthmore College inspired Diana to
dedicate her career to fighting for civil rights. (Tr. 41). Transformed, Diana returned to
Pomona College and was elected to the Asian-American Student Alliance, a group
advocating Asian-American student interests and working for equality. (Tr. 41). After
working at the Ford Foundation, she attended Georgetown Law School on a public
interest law scholarship and focused her studies on public interest law, including
teaching law to people in homeless shelters and inmates in prison. (Tr. 44). She also
handled asylum cases. (Tr. 44). Diana moved back to Chicago after her law school
graduation to work at the Chicago Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights. (Tr. 44–45). In
November 2003, Diana signed a lease to rent the third bedroom of the Unit 602 at 20
North State Street, in Chicago, Illinois (“the Unit”). (I.D. 5). The lease had a term from
November 2003 through July 2004. (I.D. 5). Around March 2004, Diana signed a contract
to purchase a two-bedroom condominium in the River North neighborhood of Chicago.
(Tr. 134). In April 2004, she informed her landlord, Fung, that she had recently
4




purchased a condominium and wanted to move out before the end of her lease. (Tr. 50).
On April 22, 2004, Fung sent Diana an e-mail granting her permission to sublet her
room. (Tr. 85). Shortly thereafter, she placed advertisements in The [Chicago] Reader and
Craigslist searching for a sub-lessee. (Tr. 52).
c. Petitioner Jennifer Ho
Jennifer Ho is a female of Chinese Cantonese descent who reads and writes
English. (I.D. 4). She grew up in China, but came to Chicago to study at a university.
(Tr. 131). Ho is a personal friend of Fung. (I.D. 4). In the summer of 2003, Fung
authorized Ho to move into one bedroom of the subject property and to receive and
process applications on his behalf for the remaining two bedrooms in the Unit. (I.D. 4).
Ho was the point of contact for current and prospective tenants of the Unit, and
undertook such managerial duties as showing the property to prospective tenants,
collecting and delivering rent checks to Fung, and overseeing minor maintenance and
repair services on the property. (I.D. 4). Additionally, Fung provided Ho access to his
email account so that she might communicate with him and the other tenants. (I.D. 4).
In the Fall of 2003, Ho showed the Unit to Diana. (Tr. 47–48). Jae Eun Shin (“Jae”), a
Korean student, was also living in the apartment at the time along with Ho. (Tr. 49). Ho
provided Diana with a rental application and forwarded the completed form to Fung.
(Tr. 48–49).
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d. Intervening-Petitioner Chak Man Fung
Chak Man Fung is a male of Chinese Cantonese descent and is fluent in
Cantonese and English. (I.D. 3). He owns the subject Unit, as well as other properties in
Chicago. (I.D. 3). He is fluent in both Cantonese and English. (I.D. 3). Fung had a real
estate license at the time the events in controversy transpired. (Tr. 133). Fung’s rental
agent was Ho who took care of collecting rents, had managerial duties, interviewed
new tenants and collected rents. (I.D. 4). He sent Diana e-mails justifying Ho’s
discriminatory acts. (Tr. 99).
e. The Unit at 20 North State Street, #602, Chicago, IL
Unit 620 is located at 20 North State Street, Chicago, Illinois. Fung purchased the
property in 2003; however, he never resided in the Unit. (I.D. 3). The Unit was originally
a one-bedroom unit. (Tr. 133). However, Fung installed walls in the living room area to
subdivide it into two separate bedrooms. (Tr. 133). Creating three separate bedroom
units and a shared common kitchen and bathroom. (Tr. 133). The owner rented each
bedroom in the Unit, with each occupant having separate leases. Id.
B.

The Search
Meki began her housing search while still living in Alabama by using the

Craigslist website. (Tr. 172). She was looking for a place that was “as close to downtown
as possible”, enabling her to walk to work. (Tr. 173). Additionally, Meki was looking for
a unit that was in a safe neighborhood, affordable, and a sublet because she was only
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going to be in Chicago for several months. (Tr. 173). On Sunday, May 9, 2004, Meki
drove to Chicago with her mother from Alabama. (Tr. 174). Her internship with
Sachnoff started the next day, leaving little time to find living arrangements for the
Summer. (Tr. 174). The two spent the night at a Holiday Inn in the downtown area
falling asleep not knowing where Meki would stay. (Tr. 174). While on her first day of
work, Meki saw a listing posted on Craigslist for an apartment in the downtown area.
After sending an e-mail to the posting, Meki was contacted by Diana and scheduled an
appointment to see the Unit that evening. Upon inspection, the Unit appeared to meet
Meki’s requirements. It was four blocks from her job and located on State Street, in the
heart of downtown, Chicago. (Tr. 176). She filled out a rental application at that time;
however she did not sign a lease, as Diana wanted her to meet the other roommates.
(Tr. 176-77). On Tuesday, May 11, 2004, Meki’s mother returned to Detroit believing her
daughter had found a suitable place to live. (Tr. 178). In the interim, Meki stayed with a
friend of a college roommate, Keturah Scott (“Ms. Scott”), while her rental application
was being processed. (Tr. 178). Ms. Scott’s apartment was a one-bedroom unit and
extremely cramped, forcing Meki to sleep on the floor while she kept her belongings in
her car. (Tr. 179–80).
C.

The Meeting
On the evening of May 12, 2004, Meki met with Diana and Ho. (Tr. 180). Ho

“took one look at Meki…had this surprised look on her face, turned around and walked
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back into her bedroom.” (Tr. 58). Meki and Diana continued talking for approximately
one hour in the kitchen in hopes that Ho would leave her bedroom and join them in
conversation. (Tr. 59). Diana could hear Ho speaking on the phone in her room to
someone in Cantonese--she sounded very upset. (T. 59-60). After an hour passed, it was
apparent Ho had no intention of speaking with Meki. Diana was therefore prepared to
proceed with the sublease agreement. (Tr. 61). Ho darted from her room upon hearing
an agreement was going to be signed stating, “no, no, no…Jae Eun has to meet her. Jae
Eun hasn’t met her yet. We have to make sure that Jae meets her.” (Tr. 61). Meki did not
sign the sublease that night feeling she would not be living in the Unit because of Ho’s
cold reception. (Tr. 182). The meeting left Meki “disappointed” and “confused,” and
Diana “absolutely furious” and “livid.” (Tr. 183).
D.

Diana’s Confrontation With Ho
Minutes after Meki left, Diana confronted Ho about her bizarre behavior. (Tr.

61). When asked why Jae was not present that evening, Ho replied, “she’s new to this
country. You know, she’s scared of Black people. You know, I don’t think you should
rent to Meki. We should find somebody else.” (Tr. 62). Diana inquired whether Ho was
in fact the person who had a problem renting to Meki, to which Ho replied: “I thought
you knew that I don’t like renting, that I wouldn’t want to rent to a Black person
because a few months ago I told you that there was a Black woman who wanted to rent
your room, and when I didn’t rent it to her she accused me of discrimination.” (Tr. 62).
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Furthermore, Ho expanded on her overt racism claiming she had “talked to a lawyer
who told [her] that [she] could discriminate” and “that there was some kind of
exception in the law.” (Tr. 62).
About an hour and a half after confronting Ho, Jae arrived home and was asked
by Diana whether she was interested in meeting Meki. (Tr. 66). Jae stated she had no
interest in meeting Meki and did not “care what race, religion that person is who rents
the room as long as the person is calm and reasonable.” (Tr. 66). Diana tried to set up
another opportunity for Ho to meet Meki after obtaining Jae’s approval. (Tr. 67). Ho
rejected this opportunity. (Tr. 67). Diana warned Ho that her actions were “completely
racist and…also illegal.” (Tr. 67). Ho replied, “Fine, sue me,” and told Diana that she
was placing an advertisement in the paper to find another renter. (Tr. 67).
E. Fung’s Offer to Diana
The next morning, Diana received an e-mail from Fung demanding to find
another tenant. (Tr. 68). Fung was so against renting to Meki that he proposed a deal. If
Diana agreed to rent to someone other than Meki for less money, he would share the
difference in the rent. (Tr. 68). Diana also discovered an advertisement form for The
Chicago Reader, a local Chicago publication, for the Unit’s rental filled out by Ho. (Tr.
69). Prompted by Ho’s actions, Diana contacted Ed Johnson, a friend who worked at
the [Chicago] Commission on Human Relations, to get a recommendation on how to
proceed. (Tr. 70). Diana decided to follow through with subleasing her Unit to Meki
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based on her conversation with Ed Johnson and the findings of independent legal
research she conducted on fair housing laws. (Tr. 71–72). The legal research led Diana to
conclude that “it would be a violation of the local laws, and possibly state and federal
laws, not to rent to Meki.” (Tr. 72).
F. Signing of The Sublease Agreement
On Friday, May 14, 2004, Diana and Meki met to sign the sublease agreement.
(Tr. 77). Diana gave Meki the keys to the apartment and main entrance to the building.
Also, Meki gave Diana checks totaling half the rent for the month of May and two
checks for $650.00 covering rent for June and July. (Tr. 78). Meki eagerly desired to
move in that weekend after staying with Ms. Scott. She was scheduled to move in
Sunday, May 16, 2004. That evening, Diana, with the help of her mother, father, and a
friend, packed “like mad,” working into the early hours of the morning so Meki could
move in on time. (Tr. 82). Early in the morning of May 16, 2004, Diana sent an e-mail to
Fung notifying him Meki would be moving in that day and requesting Ho and Jae Eun
to be properly notified of such. (Tr. 85–86). Additionally, Diana warned Fung that
refusing to rent to Meki violated numerous fair housing laws. (Tr. 85–86). Thus, Diana
respectfully requested that Fung “uphold” Meki’s right to sublease the unit. (Tr. 86).
G. The Blockade
Diana went to brunch with her parents and friend that Sunday morning when
she suddenly received a phone call. (Tr. 93). Upon checking her phone, Diana realized
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the caller was Meki, who had left a message stating she had “trouble getting into the
Unit and wanted to know if maybe there was another lock, another key that she needed
to get in.” (Tr. 94). A few minutes later, Meki called again saying that she was having
“trouble getting into the Unit” and that “it seemed like someone was blocking the
door.” (Tr. 94). Unbeknownst to Diana, earlier that morning, Meki arrived at the
apartment complex with two friends and brought items from her car to the hallway just
outside her new unit, but could not get into the Unit. (Tr. 186–87). Meki inserted her key
in the door and unlocked it, but the door wouldn’t open. (Tr. 186). Befuddled, Meki
knocked on the door, but got no response. (Tr. 186). At this point, Meki believed maybe
someone was just cleaning or in the shower and couldn’t hear her knocks; as such, she
knocked louder a second time, but to no avail. (Tr. 186). Frustrated, Meki pushed the
door enough so “it would actually separate from the door jam [where she could see]
that the door wasn’t locked.” (Tr. 188). However, the bottom of the door “[would not]
budge at all.” (Tr. 188). Meki and her friends spent approximately half an hour trying
to figure out what was going on and tried to find a way into the Unit. (Tr. 188). She
could hear water running inside the Unit, see an eye peering in the peephole, and heard
someone adjusting an object blocking the door. (Tr. 94).
Upon listening to Meki’s messages, Diana realized Ho blocked the door to bar
Meki from entering. (Tr. 94). Diana was stunned Ho would go so far to prevent Meki
from entering the Unit. (Tr. 94). Diana called Ho and left a message stating “that Meki
was moving in and she had to let Meki in.” (Tr. 97). Diana also contacted Fung and left
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a similar message. Neither Fung nor Ho ever called back. (Tr. 97). That afternoon, Diana
checked her e-mail. Upon logging into her account, Diana received an e-mail from Fung
justifying Ho’s discriminatory acts. (Tr. 99). Fung’s e-mail stated, “I am not
discriminating against anyone to rent my Unit. I think when you have to live with
someone you can discriminatively choose whom you will live with.” (Tr. 99).
H. Fung Demands Diana to Move Out
Instead of apologizing for his previous e-mail, Fung sent Diana a second,
chastising e-mail on May 17, 2004, stating she had no legal authority to sublet the Unit
to Meki. (Tr. 106). Fung also demanded that Diana return Meki’s sublease application
and instructed Diana that she had broken her lease because she failed to give him one
month’s notice before subleasing her Unit. (Tr. 107). However, Diana’s lease only stated
that she needed“ prior written consent of the lessor.” (Tr. 111). Ironically, the e-mail
also contained “standard boiler plate language” regarding non-discrimination, in part,
on the basis of race. (Tr. 107). None of Fung’s prior e-mails contained such nondiscrimination disclaimer language. (Tr. 108-109). Shortly thereafter, Diana received yet
another e-mail from Fung. (Tr. 112). The e-mail claimed Diana had broken her lease and
that Fung had found a “better applicant” to sublease the Unit. (Tr. 112). Fung further
notified Diana that he was going to keep the full amount of May’s rent even though she
was moving out early. (Tr. 112). Finally, the e-mail requested that Diana return the door
and entrance keys to Ho. (Tr. 112). Following Fung’s request, Diana returned her keys
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to him and surrendered the Unit. (Tr. 115-116). Days after moving out, Diana saw an
advertisement listing her old unit for rent. (Tr. 117). The Unit was being offered for
$595.00, which was $55.00 less than for what Meki was going to rent the Unit. (Tr. 117).
I. Meki Becomes Homeless
Without a place to live, Meki moved her belongings back in into her car and
stayed with her acquaintance, Kethura Scott, for a couple more days while searching for
another unit to sublet. (Tr. 199-200). Meki looked on the internet, but rental units were
in short supply; additionally, those units that were available were either too far away
from downtown or in rough neighborhoods. (Tr. 200). After finding nothing suitable,
Meki continued living with Ms. Scott until the middle of July. (Tr. 210). Neither Meki
nor Ms. Scott had any privacy during Meki’s stay. (Tr. 204). This living arrangement
made Meki uncomfortable, as she didn’t want to impose or be a bad house guest. (Tr.
205). Ultimately, Ms. Scott requested that Meki move out after several weeks of living
together. (Tr. 209). Ms. Scott told Meki she was going to have a houseguest staying with
her, which was arranged prior to her accommodating Meki. (Tr. 210). In total, Meki
lived with Ms. Scott for approximately six to eight weeks. (Tr. 210). Meki panicked
upon being asked to leave by Ms. Scott, as she had no place to live. (Tr. 210). It was the
middle of July and finding a sublet unit for the few remaining weeks of her internship
was unrealistic. (Tr. 210). Fortunately for Meki, she remembered that Diana had offered
earlier that Summer for Meki to stay with her in an extra bedroom at her new
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condominium if she couldn’t find a place to live. (Tr. 210). Meki contacted Diana and
moved in but the situation was uncomfortable for both strangers. (Tr. 211).
J. Administrative Hearing, Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent
HUD’s statement of the Administrative Hearing, see HUD’s Br. at 13-14.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should deny the Petition for Review, and grant the Cross-Application
for Enforcement of HUD's Final Order.
Indeed, this is a case of two very remarkable young women Meki and Diana both
of whom come from racial minority backgrounds and who are both lawyers. Meki was
denied the rental Unit because of her race and Diana was harassed and interfered with
because she assisted Meki in renting the Unit. Petitioners were properly served with
process, receiving notice of the filing of the Charge of Discrimination filed and served
on August 22, 2007. Petitioners were properly served with motions for Default on
October 3, 2007, Order granting Default on October 18, 2007, and November 7, 2007. Ho
elected not to open her mail and did not file an answer to the Charge of Discrimination,
nor moved to vacate the Default Orders. Any lack of notice stems from Ho’s decisions
not to open her notices, rather than any failure to fulfill the requirements of due
process. Ho did not have a statutory right to be represented at the November 15, 2007,
damages hearing. While Ho was permitted to have counsel present, there is no
statutory right to counsel as in criminal proceedings. Ho had the option of appearing
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with counsel and was informed to do so and was afforded ample time to procure
representation. Ho elected to hire counsel that was unavailable on the day of the
hearing and neither Ho nor her counsel properly made a request for a continuance.
Thus, the last minute request was lawfully denied by Judge O’Bryant.
There was no duty to procure a Chinese Cantonese translator for Ho. Ho was
afforded ample time to procure a Chinese Cantonese translator prior to the November
15, 2007, hearing. She was advised through a translator to obtain counsel for her
hearing and to procure her own translator. Fung failed to participate in the process. The
agency’s decision is not arbitrary or capricious, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion,
and the decision is in accordance with requirements of the law. Moreover, the
compensatory damages awarded to Meki and Diana were supported by credible
testimony and by substantial evidence, thus, the cross-application should be enforced.
ARGUMENT
I.

HO’S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews due process claims under a de novo standard of review. Phelan

v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2003), see also, Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656,
657 (7th Cir. 2002). In order to assert a violation of the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff
must be able to show that 1) she had a “property interest” and 2) that she was deprived
of this interest without due process of law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343, (1976).
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A. Ho Admits Receiving, But Not Opening, Her Mail After October 27, 2006.
The Supreme Court has held that “[the] primary purpose of the notice required
by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a hearing is
meaningful.” City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999). See, e.g., Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). This Circuit has held that to
prevail on a due process claim, “a [movant] must produce ‘concrete evidence’
indicating that the due process violation ‘had the potential for affecting’ the outcome of
the hearing.” Kuschchak v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2004). “It has long been
established that due process allows notice of a hearing (and its attendant procedures
and consequences) to be given solely in English to a non-English speaker if the notice
would put a reasonable recipient on notice that further inquiry is required.” Nazarova v.
I.N.S., 171 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Ho concedes that from October 27, 2006, until November 15, 2007,
“petitioner did not open any of the written communications or pleadings sent to her by
HUD and the Complainants-Intervenors”. (Pet. Ho Br. 7). Ho alleges that she did not
open the mail due to “her difficulty with English and because she knew she would not
understand the meaning or import of those documents without the help of an
attorney.”Id. Ho admitted that she knew the mail was from HUD and Counsel for Meki
and Diana and that she may need to show such documents to an attorney. (Pet. Ho Br.
7. ) Thus, Ho knew such mailings required further inquiry and failed to take any action
to protect he rights. Moreover, Ho spoke and understood English as was determined by
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the ALJ on November 15, 2007; therefore she could have read the documents herself
and understood their importance.
Ho further argues that she “did not have a meaningful opportunity to participate
in the hearing of liability because she did not have actual notice of that hearing.” (Pet.
Ho Br. 19). Ho’s assertion is false as she has conceded to receiving the notices. Ho was
given notice of the hearing and deliberately chose not to open her mail. Had Ho opened
her mail and acted with any semblance of diligence and inquiry possessed by a
reasonable recipient of mail, Ho would have had a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the process and avoid the default order entered on October 18, 2007. It is
not the responsibility of HUD, Meki, or Diana to ensure that Ho opens her mail.
Therefore, this Court should find that Ho’s procedural due process rights were not
violated and affirm the October 18, 2007, Default Order finding liability against Ho and
Fung.
B. The ALJ Properly Denied Ho’s Last Minute Request for Continuance of
the Hearing to Obtain Counsel.
a. The request for continuance of the Hearing was correctly denied.
In evaluating whether to grant a continuance, the court must weigh a number of
factors, including:
1) the amount of time available for preparation; 2) the likelihood of
prejudice from denial; 3) the defendant's role in shortening the effective
preparation time, 4) the degree of complexity of the case; 5) the
availability of discovery from the prosecution; 6) the likelihood a
continuance would satisfy the movant's needs; and 7) the inconvenience
and burden to the court and its pending case load.
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U.S. v. Farr, 297 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002). “The factors will be deserving of varying
weight in each situation confronted by a [ ] judge, and the [ ] judge is in ‘the best
position to evaluate and assess the circumstances presented by movant’s request for a
continuance.’”Id. “It is well established that the grant or denial of a continuance is
within the discretion of the judge and will not be overturned absent a clear showing of
abuse.” N.L.R.B. v. Pan Scape Corp., 607 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1979). See e.g., Washington
v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc. 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).
First, Ho had adequate time to prepare for the damages hearing. The Default
Order was entered October 18, 2007 and modified on November 7, 2007. The damages
hearing occurred on November 15, 2007. Thus, Ho had a month to obtain counsel or to
prepare a defense for the damages hearing. Instead, Ho stalled until the day of the
hearing to request, what was construed by the ALJ as a continuance, so she could obtain
counsel. Ultimately, Ho had sufficient time to obtain representation and to prepare
adequately for the damages hearing. Second, Ho argues that her request for
continuance prevented her from introducing testimony and from cross-examining
witnesses. (Pet. Ho Br. 22). Ho had the opportunity to cross-examine Meki, Diana,
witnesses, and to introduce affirmative testimony on her behalf in mitigation of
damages, but she chose not to.
Third, a continuance would not have satisfied Ho’s need to obtain counsel. To
date, attorney Shearer has not filed an appearance on Ho’s behalf. Even if Judge
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O’Bryant had granted Ho’s continuance, and Shearer filed an appearance on Ho’s
behalf, the outcome of the damages trial would have remained the same. Ho’s primary
argument is that the denial of her continuance deprived her of being represented by
counsel who would have introduced testimony and effectively cross-examined
witnesses that would have mitigated damage amounts. Again, Ho provides no
indication of having any potential witnesses that could have introduced affirmative
testimony on her behalf to mitigate damages. Furthermore, Meki, Diana, and Mr.
Bracken, Meki’s father, were deemed to be credible by the ALJ. (I.D. 12 - 15).
Finally, continuing the damages hearing would have placed a significant burden on the
ALJ, HUD, as well as on Meki, Diana and their attorney. Judge O’Bryant and Meki flew
in from Washington D.C. Additionally, Mr. Bracken flew in from Detroit, Michigan.
(I.D. 17). Thus, a continuance would have inconvenienced Judge O’Bryant, witnesses,
the parties and their attorneys.
Similarly, in Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc. 694 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), a
housing discrimination case under the FHA, the plaintiffs requested a continuance on
the day of trial. The trial court denied the continuance and ordered the plaintiffs to
proceed to trial. Id. at 1086. Here, Ho was aware of the fact that there would be hearing
on November 15, 2007. She admits retaining attorney Shearer “a few days” prior to the
hearing. (Pet. Ho Br. 7, 16). At that time, it would have appeared to Shearer that he
would not be able to attend the damages hearing due to another commitment. Neither
Ho nor Shearer contacted HUD, counsel for Meki and Diana or filed an emergency
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motion with the ALJ. Instead of notifying the ALJ (who was still in Washington, D.C.),
requesting a continuance, and inquiring about a translator, Ho and her counsel did
nothing. Judge O’Bryant was not even aware of Shearer’s alleged representation until
the morning of the November 15, 2007, hearing. (Tr. 10). Rather, Ho decided to arrive at
the hearing with a hand-scrawled note from Shearer. (Tr. 7). When requested to stay for
the hearing she requested to leave. (Tr. 8). When ordered to stay, for the hearing again
she requested to leave. (Tr. 18). Ho was advised that the hearing would take place with
or without her, and yet she still insisted on leaving. (Tr. 18). Ho is now requesting, that
Meki and ALJ, both of whom had flown in from D.C., counsels for HUD, and for Meki,
who all were in attendance, be rescheduled at more suitable time for her.
Ho argues the short length of her requested continuance would not have
prejudice the parties involved. As evidence, Ho provides in her brief that, “[a] few days
before November 15, 2007, [she] asked [ ] Shearer to represent [her] and he agreed to do
so for a nominal fee.” (Pet. Ho Br. 11-20). However, to date, Shearer has not filed an
appearance on her behalf with this Court. This supports Judge O’Bryant’s finding that,
“one could only speculate when [Shearer] would be prepared for a hearing in this case.”
(I.D. 2-3). Ho fails to provide any “concrete evidence” indicating that the ALJ’s denial of
her request for a continuance to obtain counsel at the last minute affected the outcome
of the hearing.
Therefore, based on the record, the Farr factors and the Washington case on point,
the ALJ’s denial of the request for continuance at the damages hearing should be
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upheld by this Court.
b. Ho did not have a right to counsel.
It is well established that, as a general matter, there is no constitutional right to
counsel… in civil cases. See, e.g., MacCuish v. United States, 844 F.2d 733, 735 (10th Cir.
1988). Instead, the rule is that counsel's errors are imputed to the client who chose his
counsel, and that the client's sole remedy is a suit for malpractice against counsel and
not litigation do-over. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. 507 U.S. 380,
397 (1993) and Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). 2
Ho concedes that there is no right to counsel in her brief. (Pet. Ho. Br. 1). But then
asserts that she had a statutory right to counsel at the November 15, 2007, damages
hearing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3612(c). (Pet. Ho Br. 21). However, Ho misquotes the
law. Section 3612(c) states in pertinent part, “at an [Administrative Law] hearing under
this section, each party may…be represented by counsel.” 42 U.S.C. §3612(c) (emphasis
added). A party’s opportunity to retain counsel for an administrative hearing is
discretionary in nature and not mandatory, as demonstrated by the use of the word
“may” as opposed to “shall.” Ho admits retaining counsel two days before the hearing.

 
2

Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General rendered an
interim opinion holding that, there is no constitutional right … to counsel…although
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies in removal proceedings, as it does in
any civil lawsuit or in any administrative proceeding, that Clause does not entitle a
person to effective assistance of counsel, much less the specific remedy of a second bite
at the apple based on the mistakes of his own lawyer. Matter of Compean and Sylla
Banglay, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, Interim decision 3632, 2009 WL 47338 (January 07, 2009).
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(Pet. Ho Br. 7). Ho selected counsel of her choice and as in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co, supra,
at 21. her remedy is not with this court but with her counsel.
Thus, the ALJ did not violate Ho’s procedural due process by denying her
request for a continuance to obtain counsel because the law does not provide for such a
right.
C. The ALJ Properly Denied Ho’s Request for a Continuance to Obtain an
Interpreter.
Ho relies on immigration cases to state her claim that her procedural due process
rights were violated when the ALJ failed to order HUD to provide a Chinese Cantonese
translator, and then subsequently failed to grant Ho a continuance so she could obtain
the services of a translator. The first of these cases is Kerciku v. INS, 314. F.3d 913 (7th Cir.
2003). However, the case at bar is distinguishable from Kerciku. In Kerciku, the
individuals seeking asylum were actually present at the hearing. Id. at 916. In fact,
testimony was heard from several individuals in Kerciku, however, they were not
allowed to have one lay witness and one expert witness testify. Id. In this case, not only
was Ho allowed to stay and testify, but she was strongly advised and at one point
ordered to stay and refused to do so. (Tr. 14). Ultimately, Ho was advised, that she
would need to make a request to the court either on her own or through counsel and
that HUD would not make any such request on her behalf. (Tr. 9). This meeting took
place over two months prior to the November 15, 2007, hearing.
Ho also cites, Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 1999), which held that “a
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non-English speaking petitioner has a due process right to an interpreter at an
administrative liability or damage hearing …”. (Pet. Ho Br. 25). The petitioner in
Nazarova sought out and provided her own translator. Id. at 481. However, Ho
completely misstates the law. Nazarova only extends the right to a translator at
immigration hearings. Id. at 484. It does not extend to administrative liability or
damage hearings. Analogizing administrative liability or damage hearings to
immigration cases, Ho has cited no authority or proffered any argument why this court
should make such analogy. Ho attempts to interpret the rule in Nazarova as requiring
the government to conduct every administrative liability or evidence hearing in the
presence of a translator, but also to provide one whether one has been requested or not.
Nazarova does not stand for either proposition.
Finally, Ho proffers what can only be interpreted as an estoppel argument. (Pet.
Ho. Br. 27). Ho states that in a September 2007 meeting, HUD provided an interpreter.
(Pet. Ho. Br. 27). At this meeting, she was strongly encouraged to locate and procure her
own counsel and HUD informed her that HUD did not represent her or her interests.
(Tr. 9). Regardless of the fact that a translator was provided at HUD’s “behest,” Ho was
informed that HUD would not provide an interpreter in the future. (Tr. 9). This
information was conveyed to Ho in Chinese by the Chinese interpreter. (Tr. 9). Ho then
argues that because she was provided with a translator at an informal meeting she
requested with opposing counsel, she expected to be provided with a translator,
without having made any request, at a hearing conducted by an administrative law
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judge who was not present at the September meeting. (Pet. Ho’s Br. 27). Ho argues this
was her expectation despite being explicitly informed to the contrary. (Tr. 9). Ho goes
on to state that the HUD attorneys first claimed that Ho had not requested a translator
and then claimed that she did not need one, as if these two arguments were mutually
exclusive. (Pet. Ho Br. 27). It was Ho who claimed at the hearing that she needed an
interpreter but did not procured one.
Moreover, Ho contends that the ALJ was obligated to supply a translator. (Pet.
Ho Br. 26). However, Ho is unable to cite any authority requiring an ALJ in a damages
hearing to provide a translator. In the alternative, Ho offers the argument that Judge
O’Bryant was obligated to grant Ho a continuance to obtain the services of a Chinese
Cantonese translator. (Pet. Ho. Br. 26-27). Yet once again, Ho is only able to cite
immigration cases, and she is unable to cite any authority analogizing immigration
hearings to administrative liability or evidence hearings. Nevertheless, the ALJ made
an observation and made the determination that Ho understood English well enough to
participate in the hearing. (Tr. 14).
Therefore, the ALJ correctly denied Ho’s request for a continuance.
D. The ALJ Properly Informed Ho of Potential Consequences of Not
Participating in the Hearing.
The court in Clark v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1981), declared an implied
obligation on the part of an ALJ to notify a claimant of his or her right to be represented
at a social security benefits hearing. Ho argues that from this implied duty stems a
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responsibility of the ALJ to inform the claimant of potential consequences of the
claimant's non-participation in a proceeding, with or without representation. This
Circuit, however, has never made a ruling expressly or impliedly that an ALJ's has an
obligation to notify a claimant of his or her right to representation in a social security
benefits hearing or, more specific in a Fair Housing Administrative Proceeding. Judge
O'Bryant nevertheless advised Ho to remain throughout the proceeding. Judge
O'Bryant went beyond her outlined responsibilities, twice advising Ho to stay through
the hearing and informing Ho that it was “in [her] best interest to stay.” (Tr. 8 and 14).
The ALJ then amended her advice to Ho and stated, “I think I’m going to revise that
and require you to stay,” after Ho again cited her desire to leave because she did not
want to participate in the damages hearing. (Tr. 14). After Ho’s third request to leave
the ALJ told her that if she wished to leave, the hearing would proceed on in her
absence. (Tr. 8, 14, 17-18). Ho left despite the ALJ's warnings and against advice of her
own future counsel to attend. (Pet. Ho Pet. 11-12). The ALJ took the appropriate steps
and advised Ho to stay.
The ALJ exceeded the scope of her responsibilities in making multiple efforts to
secure Ho’s participation in the damage hearing on November 15, 2007, and further
advised Ho that the hearing will continue in her absence. Ho was advised to participate
in the hearing even though the ALJ had no duty to do so. Thus, her procedural due
process rights were not violated.
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II.

HUD’S ORDER IMPOSING LIABILITY PURSUANT TO A MODIFIED
DEFAULT ORDER SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE AS AN “ABUSE OF
DISCRETION”
Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing an entry of a default judgment is “abuse of

discretion”. Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1990).
“To reverse…an abuse of discretion, [the Court] must conclude that no reasonable
person could agree with the trial court's judgment.” Id. at 251. In Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d
158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994), the court applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b), as a three-part
standard and burden on the moving party to show: (1) ‘good cause’ for the default; (2)
quick action to correct the default; (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the
original complaint. .” Id. A defaulted party must show a good faith reason for failing to
appear, meaning that we will grant relief only where the actions leading to the default
were not willful, careless, or negligent. Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 721 (7th Cir.
1996) (quotation marks omitted). “A litigant must show ‘exceptional circumstances’ to
justify setting aside a default judgment.” Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete
Products, Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 fn. 6 (7th Cir. 1983).
A. The ALJ’s Clarification of Language in Judge Liberty’s Original Default
Order Was Not Arbitrary, Capricious, or Abuse of Discretion.
In HUD ex rel. Sheila White v. Wooten, 2004 WL 3201000 (H.U.D. A.L.J., Order
Dec. 3, 2004), the Administrative Law Judge discussed the effect of the respondent’s
default was to admit all well-pled facts as true and to require the ALJ to analyze
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whether hearing-established facts actually support a liability finding by a
preponderance of the evidence. In ruling, the ALJ found two necessary elements for a
default order: (1) “non-responsiveness on the part of the Respondent” and (2) a “need
to show that a prima facie case could also be established; in other words, that there was
non-response in an actual case as opposed to just non-response.” Id at 4. This Circuit
likewise has held that:
A default judgment establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants are
liable to plaintiff as to each cause of action alleged in the
complaint…Although upon default, the well-pleaded allegations of a
complaint relating to liability are taken as true, allegations in a complaint
relating to the amount of damages suffered ordinarily are not. Rule
55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that ‘if, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary ... to establish the truth of any averments by evidence ... the
court may conduct a [damages] hearing. (Emphasis added).
U.S. v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal citations deleted).
Fung concedes the Default Order issued by Judge Liberty on October 18, 2007, adhered
to White’s two-part default process. (Fung Br. at 17.)
Therefore, this Court should hold that Judge O’Bryant’s modifying Default
Order did not depart from prior Agency precedent and adhered to the standards
required in DiMucci, and uphold Fung and Ho’s liability.
B. Even if the Court Finds That Meki and Diana Had to Prove Liability at
the Damages Hearing, the Record Supports Their Burden.
Fung further argues “the facts of Record are demonstrably-insufficient to
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support a prima facie section 3604(a) violation.” (Fung Br. 20). The Fair Housing Act at
§3604(a) provides that it shall be unlawful: “To refuse to…rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for…rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color…or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§3604(a). Under section 3604, a prima facie case is established by a showing that: 1) the
Complainant belongs to a minority; 2) the Respondent was aware of it; 3) the
Complainant was ready and able to accept the Respondent’s offer to rent; and 4) the
Respondent refused to deal with Complainant. Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383, 387 (7th
Cir. 1985). See also, Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir.
1982). "Direct evidence is that which can be interpreted as an acknowledgment of
defendant's discriminatory intent." Kormoczy v. HUD, 53 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff may through circumstantial evidence show defendants' discriminatory intent
directly. Id. The types of circumstantial evidence that [plaintiff] can present are:
"suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, behavior toward or comments directed at
other [people] in the protected group, and other evidence from which an inference of
discriminatory intent might be drawn . . ." . Huff v. Uarco Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir.
1997).
The record overwhelmingly provides each element of Meki and Diana’s prima
facie case of discrimination. First, Meki’s father is African-American and her mother is
Samoan, thus making Meki a member of a racial minority. (Tr. 169). Next, the facts
indicate on Friday, May 14, 2005, Diana and Meki met and signed the sublease
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agreement. (Tr. 77). Meki gave Diana checks totaling half the rent for the month of May
and two checks for $650.00, covering rent for June and July. (Tr. 78). These facts indicate
Meki’s financial ability and qualifications to rent Fung’s apartment. Next, Ho prevents
Meki from moving into the unit by barricading the door. (Tr. 186–88). Fung acquiesced
to Ho’s improper actions, stating “I am not discriminating against anyone to rent my
unit. I think when you have to live with someone you can discriminatively choose
whom you will live with.” (Tr. 99). Finally, Fung’s apartment remained on the market
listed for $595.00 per month rent which was less than what Meki was going to pay. (Tr.
117). Furthermore, Ho and Fung rented to a tenant of Asian descent. (I.D. 10). Neither
Fung nor Ho has shown that race was not a factor in the decision to deny Meki the
opportunity to rent housing. Therefore, this Court should find that Meki and Diana
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under the FHA as required by the
Default Order.
C. Exemptions Under Section §3603 Do Not Apply to Petitioners.
“Under general principles of statutory construction, ‘[o]ne who claims the benefit
of an exception from the prohibition of a statute has the burden of proving that [the]
claim comes within the exception.’ “Mills Music, Inc., v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 188 n. 20
(1985) (White, J., dissenting). The Court has held the FHA is to be given “generous
construction” in order to achieve the purpose of the Act, which is to “replace the
ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.’”Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211–12, (1972). Courts have found that exemptions to the FHA should
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be construed narrowly. See United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 883 (3d
Cir. 1990) and United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 550 (W.D.Va.
1975).
Here, Fung finds it troubling that “the Order fail[ed] to analyze (or even identify)
a single fact which, on its face, could establish that Fung and Ho were not exempted by
§3603,”. (Fung Br. 21). The law does not require such analysis. Fung and Ho bear the
burden of proving an exemption claim. Fung and Ho had sufficient opportunity to
assert a possible exemption under §3603(b) at the time of entry of the Default Orders.
Fung and Ho could have asserted a defense even at the time HUD investigated the case.
However, Fung and Ho waived such exemption by not participating in the legal
process, by not responding, or attending a single hearing on these matters. Section
3603(b) supplies two possible exemptions. Even assuming arguendo, section 3603(b)
would not exempt Ho or Fung from their discriminatory actions towards Meki and
Diana.
a. Exemption under §3603(b)(1)
In this case, §3603(b)(1) does not apply to Fung because he used the rental
services of Ho as his agent. The record provides that in the fall of 2003, Ho showed
Diana the Unit. Ho provided Diana with a rental application and forwarded the
completed form to Fung. Accordingly, Ho acted as Fung’s agent when she showed his
apartment; ensured Diana properly filled out the rental application, and forwarded the
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rental application to Fung’s attention.
Moreover, §3603(b)(1) does not apply to Ho because she is not the owner of the
subject unit. In Singleton v. Gendason, 545 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1976), the court held
that, “tenants of a dwelling cannot claim the protection of Section 3603(b)(1) because
that exemption is only available to owners.” 3 Finally, section 3603(b)(1) does not apply
because the Unit is an apartment converted into three rental bedrooms and therefore,
not considered a “single-family home.” Multiple circuits have similarly strictly
construed the term “single-family house.” See, e.g., Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 287-88
(5th Cir. 2003) (house converted into four rental units is not “single-family” house and
thus, not exempt under §3603(b)(1)); Lamb v. Sallace, 417 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E.D. Ky.
1976) (duplex is not covered by the term “house” in §3603(b)(1)); Massaro v. Mainlands
Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir. 1993) (use restrictions placed
on a home in a cooperative or condominium development may sufficiently distinguish
the unit from a “single-family house” so as to remove it from the §3603(b)(1)
exemption). Based on strict construction of the term “single-family house,” this Court
should find that the exemption was waived and that §3603(b)(1) does not apply to
Fung’s converted three-bedroom rental apartment.
b. Exemption under §3603(b)(2)

 

The Court in Singleton found “[t]he legislative history of Title VIII indicates that
Congress intended that the word “owner” in Section 3603(b)(1) be given its plain
meaning.” Singleton fn.3 at 1226.

3

31




The second exemption §3603(b)(2) applies when “rooms or units in dwellings
containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four
families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence.” 42 U.S.C. §3603(b)(2). The
exemption does not apply to Fung because he did not “maintain and occupied” the Unit
The exemption does not apply to Ho because she again does not own the Unit. Id.
Additionally, §3603(b) exemptions do not apply when discriminatory statements
are made under §3604(c). Section §3604(c) states in pertinent part: It shall be
unlawful…to make…statement, with respect to the…rental of a dwelling that indicates
any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race…or an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. §3604(c). The record states
that on May 17, 2004, Fung sent Diana an e-mail stating: “I think when you have to live
with someone you can discriminatively choose whom you will live with.” (Tr. 99). Fung
sent this e-mail demonstrating his ability to prevent Meki from renting one of his units
and upholding Ho’s actions of preventing Meki from taking possession of her rental
unit. Thus, Fung violated §3604(c) when he made and published the statement with
respect to the rental of his unit indicating discrimination based on race.
Therefore, section 3604(b)(2) does not apply because, the exemption was waived,
Fung did not live in the property and discriminatory statements were made under
3604(c). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Petition for Review.
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INTERVENING/CROSS-PETITIONERS MEKI BRACKEN
AND DIANA LIN’S OPENING BRIEF
I.

THE HUD DECISION WAS NOT "ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, OR OTHERWISE NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LAW
Standard of Review
This court’s reviews an entry of a default by applying the “abuse of discretion”

standard. Merrill Lynch Mortg. Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d 246, 250-51 (7th Cir. 1990). “To
reverse…an abuse of discretion, [the court] must conclude that no reasonable person
could agree with the trial court's judgment.” Id. at 251.
A. Meki Bracken And Diana Lin Were Denied Housing By Ho And Fung In
Violation Of The Fair Housing Act.
B. Ho and Fung Refused to Rent to Meki, Made Discriminatory
Statements with Respect to Meki Bracken and Diana Lin’s Sublease
Agreement on Account of Meki’s Race.
Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent HUD’s Argument I, sections
A., B., and subsections 1-3, discussing Petitioners’ violations of the Fair Housing Act.
See HUD Br. at 17-30.
C. Ho and Fung failed to answer to the Charge of Discrimination and
default decision was entered.
The failure to answer to the charge within thirty-days of its filing shall deem the
allegations in the charge admitted. 24 CFR 180.420. See also HUD v. Cabusora, 1992 WL
406524 (HUD Order March 23, 1992). In Jones v. Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994)
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the court applied Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b), as a three-part standard and burden on
the moving party to show: (1) ‘good cause’ for the default; (2) quick action to correct the
default; (3) the existence of a meritorious defense to the original complaint. Jones v.
Phipps, 39 F.3d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1994). A defaulted party must show a good faith reason
for failing to appear, meaning that we will grant relief only where the actions leading to
the default were not willful, careless, or negligent. Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 721
(7th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Ho only offers that she could not find an attorney to represent her.
This reason must fail as it is not ‘good cause’. It is abundantly clear that Ho took no
action to correct the default orders. Additionally, Ho raises no apparent defense to the
Charge of Discrimination. Both Ho and Fung failed to answer to the charge which led to
the entry of a default judgment. Ho appeared at a damages hearing on November 15,
2007, but she left shortly after the proceeding had commenced and before she was able
to offer any testimony. (I.D. 2). Fung failed to appear. Similarly, see also, Argument Part
II at page 25-6, supra.
Therefore, the default orders were proper and should be upheld.
II.

MEKI AND DIANA SUFFERED COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND SUCH
DAMAGES WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Standard of Review
Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent HUD’s standard of review.

See HUD Br. at 30.
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A. Meki and Diana suffered out-of-pocket expenses as a result of
Petitioners discriminatory actions.
It has been held that the amount of compensatory damages should be adequate to
redress the deprivation of a complainant's civil rights. Corriz v. Narajo, 667 F.2d 892
(10th Cir. 1981). Complainant is entitled to compensation for the tangible expenses
caused by Respondents' denial of housing. See, e.g., HUD ex rel. Herron v. Blackwell, 908
F.2d 864, 873 (11th Cir. 1990).
Meki visited a couple of places after not being allowed to sublet the Unit, but they
were not close to downtown and were not in neighborhoods with which she was
comfortable with. (Tr. 200). Meki spent approximately a week searching for a new
apartment after not being allowed to sublet the Unit. (Tr. 203). As a result of Ho’s
discriminatory acts, Meki was forced to move in with an acquaintance, Ms. Scott. Living
at Keturah’s place was manageable, but certainly not comfortable. There was no
privacy. (Tr. 191). Meki had to sleep on the floor and did not sleep well. (Tr. 203). 
a.

Meki’s out of pocket expenses as a result of Fung and Ho’s
discriminatory actions.

b.

Diana’s out-of-pocket expenses and inconvenience as a
result of Fung and Ho’s discriminatory actions.

Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent HUD’s discussion on out of
pocket expenses for Meki and Diana. See HUD Br. at 33-34.
B. Meki loss of housing opportunity and inconvenience.
To recover for loss of housing opportunity the complainant must describe any
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injury with specificity. HUD v. Tucker, 1992 WL 406533 n.23 (HUD A.L.J. Aug. 24, 1992).
Complainants who are unlawfully denied housing may receive compensation for time
spent seeking alternative housing and for additional expenses associated with living in
alternative housing. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971); HUD v.
Edelstein, 1991 WL 442784 (HUD A.L.J. Dec. 9, 1991); HUD v. Kelly, 1992 WL 406534
(HUD A.L.J. Aug. 26, 1992) (award for emotional distress and loss of housing
opportunity caused by denial of home located near parents, friends, direct bus route to
work, drug or convenience store, library, and park).
Here, Meki spent approximately a week and a half searching for a new
apartment after not being allowed to sublet the Unit. She continued to look for similar
housing in the downtown area close to her job. Over that time, she also looked on line,
went to see various apartments and spoke to landlords on the phone about the
availability of housing. During that week, Meki stayed in a hotel. Thereafter, she was
forced to impose upon an acquaintance, Ms. Scott. Ms. Scott allowed her to stay with
her in her one bedroom apartment. Meki had to sleep on a mattress on the floor in her
living room. (I.D. 10-11). Ms. Scott’s house was located far north from the downtown
area and it took Meki twenty minutes on the bus to get to work everyday versus a five
minute walk from the Unit. Meki felt that she was imposing on her friend’s privacy and
after approximately six to eight weeks, she moved out.
Similarly, in HUD v. Banai, 1995 WL 72441 (H.U.D. A.L.J. February 3, 1995)
affirmed in Banai v. HUD, 102 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir.1997), the plaintiffs were a Black
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unmarried couple who applied for an apartment following Hurricane Andrew and
were denied by Respondent upon learning that plaintiffs were Black. Complainant’s
loss the housing opportunity when the landlord denied the housing that was uniquely
suited to their special needs, resulting from one of the plaintiff’s physical injuries.
Complainants were force to live with their friends to avoid homelessness. As a result
Complainants relationship as a couple was negatively affected by losing their privacy
and a suitable place to live all because of the landlord’s racial discrimination. The court
awarded the Complainants $35,000 for emotional distress, inconvenience and lost
housing opportunity. See also Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Meki lost her housing opportunity of the Unit because Ho and Fung refused to
rent to her solely because of her race. Had she lived at the Unit, she would have been
able to walk to work, would have had her own private room with a bed, a closet to keep
her clothes as opposed to having to keep her clothes in her car, could have cooked her
own meals and would have avoided the experience of sleeping on the floor.
Therefore the ALJ award for loss of Housing Opportunity was reasonable.
C. Meki suffered significant emotional distress as a result
of Petitioners’ discriminatory actions.
Emotional distress damages are a proper remedy for fair housing cases. United
States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 931 (7th Cir. 1992). However, damages for emotional
distress may be inferred from the circumstances, as well as established by testimony
and no evidence of economic loss or medical evidence of mental or physical symptoms
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need be submitted. HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872 (11th Cir. 1990). The finder of
fact is in the best position to evaluate both the humiliation inherent in the circumstances
and the witness’ explanation of her injury. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 933. See also, Seaton v.
Sky Realty, 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974). In determining the proper amount to award
a plaintiff for emotional distress, a tribunal should “look at both the direct evidence of
emotional distress and the circumstances of the act that allegedly caused the distress.”
Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 932. “The more inherently degrading or humiliating the
defendant’s action is, the more reasonable it is to infer that a person would suffer
humiliation or distress from that action.” Id.
Here, Meki was very confused and frustrated as a result of being locked out of
the Unit by Ho. (Tr. 189). She was shocked, disappointed, and frustrated when she
learned that Ho did not want her to live in the Unit because she was Black. Meki
described the situation as a “rough welcome to the real world.” (Tr. 195). Meki could
not even fathom what Ho was thinking. (Tr. 196). Meki called her best friend, Nicole
Carryl to discuss what had happened and she cried on the phone to her. (Tr. 197). Meki
and Nicole Carryl prayed on the phone together. (Tr. 197). Everyday that passed Meki
was losing opportunities to rent an apartment, which was a concern to her. (Tr.
198). Searching for another place to sublet was very draining on Meki. (Tr. 201). Meki
has developed a new consciousness about what other people may be thinking of
her. (Tr. 201). As a result of Ho’s discriminatory act, Meki was forced to move in with
an acquaintance, Ms. Scott. Living at Ms. Scott’s place was manageable, but certainly
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not comfortable. She had no privacy. (Tr. 191).This incident resulted in Meki’s
withdrawal from the City of Chicago. (Tr. 212). After law school, Meki applied to jobs in
Los Angeles, New York, Atlanta, and Washington D.C., but not Chicago because of this
incident, despite the fact that she would have been much closer to her family located in
Detroit. Even when Meki talks to others today, she still thinks of the incident as
shocking and disappointing. Prior to this incident, Meki would normally get eight
hours of sleep every night and after the incident, she would normally sleep for four to
five hours per night.
Similarly in Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D. N.Y. 1997), plaintiffs were
an African American husband and White wife couple who applied to sublet an
apartment in a cooperative (“Co-op”) building. They were denied the sub-let
application by the Co-op board solely because of the husband’s race. Id. at 215.
Plaintiffs cited feelings of embarrassment, humiliation, anger, and demoralization from
treatment by the defendants in the Co-op board interview. Id. at 223. They testified that
the experience was their “worst nightmare,” “reduced to tears” twice, “difficult for
feelings to go away,” fear of lack of trust from others. Id. Based on their experience of
discrimination the court awarded $228,000 for emotional distress and mental anguish.
The court stated that the Plaintiffs were credible and the evidence was persuasive to
sustain the award. Id. at 225.
In Kreuger v. Hud, 115 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1997), the court upheld an award of
damages by the ALJ in the amount of $22,000 where the emotional distress was based
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almost entirely on the plaintiff’s own testimony that the Respondent made her feel “real
dirty,” “like a bad person,” and that he scared her. Id. In Dubin v. LaGrange Country
Club, 1997 WL 323831, 1 (N.D.Ill. 1997), a plaintiff who was discriminated against was
awarded $40,000 after he became jittery, suffered from headaches, stomach aches, was
very upset, depressed, and had trouble sleeping. Id. Also, in HUD v. Godlewski, 2007 WL
4578540 (HUD A.L.J. December 21, 2008), the ALJ held Respondent to be in violation of
section §3604(c) for posting a for rent sign that said “for rent…no kids.” Id. The court
awarded $18,000, in emotional distress. The court stated that emotional distress award
was reasonable, because the sign itself caused the complainant great emotional distress,
above and beyond the unavailability of the housing. Id. 4 These cases are in line with
Meki’s unfortunate discriminatory experience of humiliation, embarrassment and stress
caused by Ho and Fung solely because of Bracken’s race. Mr. Bracken testified and
confirmed Meki severe emotional distress. (Tr. 239).
Therefore, the ALJ’s award for emotional distress was reasonable given the
testimony and egregiousness of the case.
a.

Complainant Lin suffered significant emotional distress as a result of
Petitioners’ discriminatory actions.

 

The key factor in determining the size of an award is the victim’s reaction to the
discriminatory conduct; gauges of reasonableness and extent of a victim’s reaction to
the conduct are the egregiousness of the discriminatory conduct and susceptibility of
the victim. HUD v. Banai, 1995 WL 72441 (HUD A.L.J., February 3, 1995).
4
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Intervening-Respondents hereby adopt Respondent HUD’s discussion on
emotional distress for Diana Lin. See HUD Br. at 33-34. 5






CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Petition for Review, affirm

the HUD Secretary’s Order, grant the Cross-Application for Enforcement and for leave
for Intervening-Respondents to petition for reasonable attorneys’ fees and for any other
relief this Court deems just.
Respectfully submitted,
MEKI BRACKEN & DIANA LIN
Intervening-Respondents/CrossPetitioners
Dated: January 23, 2009
By: ________________________
J. Damian Ortiz
J. Damian Ortiz, Esq.
The John Marshall Law School
Fair Housing Legal Clinic
55 East Jackson Blvd., Suite 1020
Chicago, IL 60604
Tel: (312) 786-2267 


Fax: (312) 786-1088















 
5

Note that the appendix attached to Petitioner Ho’s brief includes an incomplete copy

of the Initial Decision, and that Intervening-Petitioner Fung’s brief includes an ineligible
copy of the Initial Decision. Thus, Intervening-Respondents have attached a complete
and legible copy for the Court’s review in the appendix. 
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